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A NEED FOR CHANGE?
... Due to our military superiority, potential enemies, whether nations or terrorist groups, may be more likely in the future to resort to terrorist acts or other attacks against vulnerable civilian targets in the United States instead of conventional military operations.
... The Federal Government will respond rapidly and decisively to any terrorist incident in the United States, working with state and local governments to restore order and deliver emergency assistance.' --William J. Clinton, A National
Military Strategy for a New Century
The 1998 National Security Strategy (NSS) thus acknowledges the increasing threat to civilian targets and infrastructure within the borders of the United States.
The document points to increasing globalization as a tool through which both traditional and new, transnational adversaries may avoid the conventional strengths of the United States and challenge the safety of our citizens and security of our borders.
The NSS defines vital interests as those of overriding interest to the "'survival, safety and vitality" of the nation.
It identifies homeland defense as one of these vital interests, in that protection of citizens and critical infrastructures at home is "an intrinsic and essential element of our security strategy." 2 The document goes on to describe the focus of national preparedness efforts. To ensure success in homeland defense, the nation must approach the problem of adequate federal response in more aggressive, more constructive ways. We must be more efficient in attacking the problem, especially with current budget and resource constraints. We can achieve some of these efficiencies through unity of effort, but only if we are willing to drop some of the interdepartmental and interagency competition so characteristic of our governmental bureaucracy. This paper will examine the federal domestic crisis response apparatus as it currently exists, and attempt to identify some of the significant problems with that apparatus. Finally, it will make recommendations for change, in a search for greater efficiency and unity of effort.
THE NEW GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
The ambiguous security environment in which we currently find ourselves only complicates the challenges of a world in team's primary function is to provide support to the CDRG and act as a principal coordinating node for information and resource allocation to the overall response effort. Figure 2 graphically depicts the sequence of response actions. The unwieldy organization of the plan tends toward ad'hoc'ism at all levels. This is evident in the disaster specific, case-by-case designation of lead federal agency and FCO, and in the sequential nature of the appointment process. Though the delegation of appropriate authorities appears to be clearly delineated within the document, considerable ambiguity remains.
Significant difficulty arises when intelligence and, more specifically, counterintelligence operations are conducted within the borders of a democratic society such as our own. In a totalitarian state, the simple existence of opposition groups would be of interest to the government's intelligence apparatus, and would thus be targeted for collection. In a democracy, however, opposition is a basic tenet of the governmental system, and as such, would be beyond the scope of national intelligence interest.
The real difficulty in a democratic society is in determining true national security threats from legitimate opposition activities protected under the governmental system. The FBI viewed the Aum as a CIA problem; the CIA viewed it as a domestic police problem for the Japanese; and, within the CIA, bureaucratic divisions slowed progress.
The subcommittee learned that the CIA's Counter Proliferation Center viewed the Aum as a terrorist problem to be handled by the CIA Counter Terrorism Center.
The Counter Terrorism Center, however, classified it as a proliferation or regional problem falling under the purview of the agency's regional desks.
The regional desks, in turn, shifted the responsibility to others.
Meanwhile, no one in the CIA was focusing on the Aum and their WMD development program -until after Tokyo. 10 
-Senator
Sam Nunn, Congressional Subcommittee Report following the Tokyo subway bombing by Aum Shinrikyo, 1995
RECObff"NDATIONS
Intelligence.
The best defense against terrorist attack within our borders rests on awareness, followed by preemption. • clandestine or deceptive foreign-influenced activities that are detrimental to Canadian interests, or threaten any person.
9 activities directed toward or supporting the threat or use of serious violence to achieve political ends. It is a given that early warning, followed by preemption is the best defense against terrorist attack. Even the best intelligence system, however, cannot be expected to expose every threat to national security, and thereby aid in establishing the conditions for preemptive action. This is especially true when the threat is transnational and using asymmetric means to prosecute its plans, making it difficult to identify and defend against.
In the absence of early warning, it would seem that the only reasonable response to the problem of providing maximum protection for both the public at large and our national infrastructure lies in a truly efficient governmental response apparatus. That apparatus must be based on a standing framework that encompasses the case-by-case requirements of specific events. It must be a sustained, well-rehearsed effort, founded on a genuine desire to raise the level of knowledge and awareness of the general public with respect to the consequences of WMD attack, and not on the short-term, political motivations of the current administration.
The future threat will not afford us the luxury of years to prepare extensive plans based on known requirements. Only through constant preparedness will we be able to achieve the unity of effort and level of cooperation necessary to minimize the damage from WMD attack, and respond quickly and efficiently to save lives and property. If we, as a nation, do not effectively meet this new and uncomfortable challenge, we most assuredly will pay the price. When, not if, the attack comes, the question is whether we will have had the maturity and foresight to put aside our differences and work together to build effective responses to that challenge.
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